Ovvero: Pararsi un po' il cul* in questo pazzo pazzo mondo di carte filigranate, iperfinanza globalizzata e picco delle risorse

sabato 17 gennaio 2015

Qualche altro link sulle ragioni dell'abbandono svizzero del peg a 1,20 con l'euro


Stefano Bassi ed Anna Ryden sentono anche loro odore di QE in salsa europea dopo l'un-peg svizzero e Stefano anche forse odore di eurosplit in euro nord ed euromed .. ma vediamo a proposito il post in evidenza ora su ZH, che tira fuori un po' di teorie su sta mossa imprevista e alla garibaldina da parte della SNB:
Zero Hedge - What Really Happened At The SNB Yesterday: One Person's Take
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/16/2015

(...) The SNB was clearly caught by surprise itself and didn't have time to make up some better lies. But why this sudden change of heart, throwing in the towel causing book losses of somewhere around CHF 75bn (>10% GDP)?

Some theories:
a) SNB had to buy Euros by the billions every day, and the balance sheet was exploding. FX holdings, at almost 500bn at the end of 2014 might have reached 600bn or more (almost 100% of GDP). SNB is a listed bank with minority shareholders (like the German Theo Siegert, who holds 5.5%). So may be Swiss regulator was getting uneasy with leverage?

b) Foreign FX is not held at the SNB, but rather at an account at a foreign bank in name of the SNB. May be at the ECB itself. So the ECB probably knew exactly what was going on, and how many Euros the SNB was piling up. If the number was getting out of hand, ECB could have threatened to leak some info, inviting speculators to mount an attack on the SNB.

c) SNB had to hold the fort until after the gold referendum, since such a disaster would have undermined trust in the SNB and possibly have tilted a few towards voting "yes".

d) After the opinion of the ECJ on bond buying it has become pretty clear the ECB will go all-in at its next meeting and begin buying Euro-zone bonds in earnest. The SNB was running already into difficulties finding AAA Euro-zone bonds to buy with a positive yield (to "recycle" all the Euros bought). The SNB was forced further and further out on the maturity ladder, increasing DV01 (the risk should interest rates start rising).

e) ECB made an offer to the SNB to take those Euro-zone bonds off the SNB's balance sheet. In exchange, the SNB had to promise to stop buying Euros, effectively ending the peg. The ECB was never very fond of the SNB's interventions, since the large buying of Euros probably left the Euro stronger than it otherwise could have been, thereby working against the ECB's intentions. Letting the SNB know what is about to happen next week (and that the SNB would have been overwhelmed by Euro printing) left little choice. For the ECB killed two birds with one stone: it removed a large buyer of Euros, and it would give the ECB a large chunk of bonds they otherwise would have had to buy via the market.

f) The ECB told the SNB it couldn't care less about a "Grexit" (exit of Greece from the Euro-zone). The SNB would have to expect massive further inflows into the CHF in such a case.

g) Interestingly, an article appeared in the NZZ newspaper a few days before the cap fell ("Euro Mindestkurs - SNB-Doyen will neue Untergrenze", NZZ am Sonntag, January 11, 2015. In the article, Ernst Baltensperger, an "influential thinker in monetary policy", recommended giving up the 1.20 barrier as potential losses from the SNB's balance sheet were rising. He also floated the idea of replacing the Euro barrier with a cap versus a basket of currencies (50% Euro, 50% US Dollar).


Ma la cosa ha attirato di più la mia attenzione è questo commento al post dei Tylers, che parla evidentemente degli anni '30-'40 e di come si stava delineando allora un potere finanziario globale, in mano a pochi privati cittadini, capace di tirare i fili di tutti i governi e di tutte le banche centrali. Banche centrali e Governi quindi strumenti in mano a pochi facoltosissime elite private e non motori primi del male del mondo come piace dipingerli ogni giorno agli "austriaci":
The powers of financial capitalism had another far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole.

This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences.

The apex of the system was to be the BIS, the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the world's central banks which were themselves private corporations.

Each central bank, in the hands of men like Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Charles Rist of the Bank of France, and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, sought to dominate its government by its ability to control Treasury loans, to manipulate foreign exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent economic rewards in the business world."
Professor Carroll Quigley; Georgetown University Professor and mentor of William Clinton. "Tragedy & Hope", page 324

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